The Relevance of the Middle Ages to the History of Science and Technology by Steneck, Nicholas H.
The Relevance of the Middle Ages to the 
History of Science and Technology 
NICHOLAS H .  STENECK 
Department of History 
University of Michigan 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109 
RIOR TO THE LATE nineteenth century, few scholars assigned much im- P portance to the Middle Ages when discussing the development of modern 
science and technology. Most assumed that the medieval period was best seen 
as a backward age whose darkness helped set out the brilliance of the Scien- 
tific Revolution and Enlightenment. Beginning in the first decade of this cen- 
tury, Pierre Duhem tried to change this view by presenting evidence of im- 
portant scientific discoveries that were supposedly made in the fourteenth 
century by Parisian and English scholastics. By the late 1920s, Charles Homer 
Haskins drew back the curtains even farther with his speculations about the 
importance of the renaissance of the twelfth century.’ With the renewed in- 
terest in medieval science and technology that followed, the way was opened 
for a critical reassessment of the relevance of the Middle Ages to the develop- 
ment of our modern scientific-technological world. 
However, the process of reassessment has yet to produce any consensus 
on the relevance of the medieval period to the scientific and technological revo- 
lutions of western society. Duhem’s continuity thesis is now seen as much too 
optimistic. Fourteenth-century thinkers criticized elements of the Aristotelian 
world view, but they did not abandon it. Their teachings on astronomy did 
not anticipate Copernicus’s contributions to astronomy, nor did they discover 
inertia or analytical geometry. Save for a few possible minor exceptions from 
astronomy, optics, and mathematics, it is difficult to point to any specula- 
tions about nature maintained in the Middle Ages that were not later over- 
turned during the course of the Scientific Revolution. 
When the notion of direct intellectual ties became untenable, scholars began 
looking for evidence of indirect relevance, seizing next on methodology. John 
R. Randall and Alistair Crombie tried to demonstrate that Galileo‘s scientific 
methods had been anticipated by earlier Italians and before them scholastics 
of the high Middle Ages, such as Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon.2 But 
again, the significance of the connection faded upon closer examination. 
Galileo scholars have since demonstrated that the roots of Galileo’s scientific 
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methods cannot easily be traced to a single tradition, such as the hypothetico- 
deductive method advanced by earlier scholastics, and the origins of the 
scholastic methods in question are themselves traceable to fundamental 
Aristotelian teachings. 
With the rejection of both methodological and intellectual ties, historians 
turned to less direct connections to establish relevance for the medieval period. 
One way this was done was by giving a new twist to a thesis first advanced 
by Duhem. Duhem had argued that the ban on the teaching of some aspects 
of Aristotelian science in the well-known Condemnation of 1277 forced later 
scholastics to adopt new ideas to replace those that had been condemned. 
So it was, Duhem argued, that fourteenth-century scholastics anticipated 
Copernican astronomy when responding to the prohibition against teaching 
that "God could not move the world with rectilinear m ~ t i o n . " ~  Subsequent 
scholars, who, as mentioned, for the most part have rejected this aspect of 
Duhem's work, have nonetheless continued to study the response to the Con- 
demnation of 1277 for evidence of more subtle transitions that could have 
paved the way for later scientific developments. 
Of particular promise in this regard seems to be an intellectual distinction 
fourteenth-century scholastics used to get around the rigid limitations posed 
by the Condemnation of 1277, the distinction between Gods two powers - 
absolute and ~ r d a i n e d . ~  The theologians who promulgated the Condemna- 
tion of 1277 objected to limitations that so-called radical thinkers were placing 
on God, e.g. that God could not move the world with rectilinear motion. 
Fourteenth-century scholastics circumvented this objection by agreeing that 
in accordance with absolute power God could do anything, but that under 
the agreement of ordained power God had produced the specific world that 
exists, which world could not be moved in a straight line, abhorred vacuums, 
and was centered around a stationary earth. In this way they were able to 
discuss in an imaginary way things that might have or could have been, while 
keeping to the orthodoxy of the accepted Aristotelian world view. Some 
scholars believe that this compromise represents a significant step toward the 
Scientific Revolution. But what was the nature of that step? 
Amos Funkenstein has argued that significant advances were made in the 
course of "absolute-power" (de potentia absoluta) arguments. Whether or not 
fourteenth-century thinkers ultimately accepted such arguments is not what 
really matters, according to Funkenstein. Rather, the significance of the de 
potentia absoluta argument is that in bringing the improbable into clear view 
and in subjecting impossibility to a critical analysis, it prepared the way for 
the ultimate acceptance of the improbable and impossible. He suggests, there- 
fore, that 
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we ought to pay close attention to the terms in which a theory defines "improb- 
abilities" and, still more important, "impossibilities." The more precise the argu- 
ment the likelier it is to be a candidate for future revisions. Once the impermis- 
sible assumption is spelled out with some of its consequences, i t  is but a matter 
of time and circumstances (. . .) until the truly radical alternative is reconsidered.5 
There is, according to this view, still some merit to the hypothetical discus- 
sions of the fourteenth century, even if that merit does not involve directly 
the people advancing them. By mapping out the ground on which the battle 
would eventually be fought, fourteenth-century thinkers were participating, 
however tangentially, in the Scientific Revolution that was to follow. 
Heiko Oberman and Gordon Leff believe that it is the absoluta-ordinata 
distinction itself that is of most importance. Both argue that the individu- 
alizing, as opposed to universalizing, thrust of the two-power distinction, com- 
bined with the fact that science operates almost exclusively in the ordained 
world and without the aid of revealed truths, left the study of nature in a 
state of relative freedom - from theology and metaphysics - in the fourteenth 
century and in need of developing methods of its own for discovering truth. 
The results, again for both Leff and Oberman, are nothing less than tradition- 
breaking, with the methods of modern science being established to fill the 
void. Interestingly, however, it is at this point that agreement between the 
two breaks down. 
For Leff, the important methodological developments that follow are those 
that bring mathematics and logical procedures into the study of nature. 
Now this detachment of physical theory from a predominantly metaphysical 
and theological context, in which it has been subordinated to wider metaphysical 
and theological issues, was the condition of its independent development; it ena- 
bled physical problems to be treated in their own terms by specifically physical 
and mathematical considerations and not as instances to illustrate metaphysical 
or theological questions. . . .6 
The significance of this development for Leff is that 
. . . in the fourteenth century, for the first time, a distinctive body [of] scientific, 
mainly mechanical, theory arose with its own independent principles and proce- 
dures, which were self-contained and not subservient to higher nonphysical prin- 
ciples. It arose from the quantitative treatment, through the application of 
mathematics and up to a point logic, of problems which until then had been 
considered qualitatively under their different categories of movement, time, place, 
quantity, and quality. 
These new quantitative methods mark the beginning, albeit inchoate, of fu- 
ture scientific procedure, namely, in generalizing the conclusion arrived at by 
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calculation or analysis as formulae or laws to be taken as axioms on the Eu- 
clidean model and applied to physical phenomena.7 
For Oberman, on the other hand, it is the experimental, not the abstract math- 
ematical method, that develops in the wake of the absoluta-ordinata dis- 
tinction. 
In both theology and physics the distinction between possibility and reality helped 
to free man from the smothering embrace of metaphysics. Yet in physics the 
same distinction works itself out in a different way . . , . Whereas in theology 
the established order . . . is at the same time the revealed order . . . , in the 
realm of physics the established order is the order of the established laws of 
nature, still to be investigated and freed from the babylonian captivity of 
metaphysical a priori. 
In this climate there emerges before our eyes the beginnings of the new science. 
We see the first contours of this science in a double thrust: (1) the conscious 
and intellectually ascetic reduction and concentration on experientia . . . [and] 
(2) the discovery of the scientific role of imagination that allows for experiments8 
Thus, some agreement seems to be emerging over the belief that the medieval 
period may be seen as paving the way for later developments, but with the 
questions of "for what?" and "how?" remaining very much open to debate. 
That ambiguity emerges at this point is understandable. The division be- 
tween Leff and Oberman reflects a deeper rift within the history of science 
itself over the cause(s) of the Scientific Revolution. If scholars could agree 
that Galileo or Newton was more an experimenter than a speculative scien- 
tist, or the reverse, it would then be easier to decide which of the many possi- 
bilities inherent in the absoluta-ordinata distinction might have paved the way 
for the Scientific Revolution. However, as long as debate continues over the 
best way to characterize and account for the Scientific Revolution, establishing 
a basis for judging the relevance of the Middle Ages to the history of science 
will remain a difficult and uncertain task. 
The problem of relevance is, moreover, further complicated by the fact that 
it is not at all certain that any of the frameworks or models used to charac- 
terize the transition from medieval to modern has any explanatory power. 
Funkenstein operates within the traditional model adopted by intellectual 
historians. He views the history of science as the ongoing process of advancing 
increasingly sophisticated descriptions of nature, resting the importance of 
the absoluta-ordinata distinction on the contribution it makes to generating 
new ideas. Leff and Oberman operate more within the methodological model, 
adding the key element of a critical values transformation - from universalism 
to particularism - which creates the demand (or opportunity) for new methods. 
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The chain of events that develops under this model is first the shift in values 
(fourteenth century), which sets in motion the secondary chain of events 
(methological development, fourteenth-seventeenth centuries), which produces 
the Scientific Revolution. 
As explanatory principles, both models have weaknesses. Neither can fore- 
cast the course of historical events. Knowing when an idea might first have 
been advanced, either as a tentative hypothesis or to be rejected, provides 
no information on when that idea will be adopted, i.e. cause a revolution. 
For the latter, Funkenstein readily admits one has to turn to other factors, 
such as "a different climate of opinion, tensions within the old theory, de- 
velopments in other fields, [and/or] new factual e~idence."~ Leff and Oberman's 
model, even though it focuses on a more fundamental and potentially dy- 
namic factor - a basic values transformation - does not account for the long 
delay between the transformation and its fruits. Once again, other factors 
would have to be brought in to explain why the potential that seems to be 
present in the medieval period took so long to develop. 
The fact that it seems so necessary to turn to "other factors" to explain the 
timing and actual transformation from the potential of the medieval period 
to the Scientific Revolution strongly suggests, I would argue, that changes 
at the level of these "other factors" may be the Scientific Revolution. Certainly, 
it would seem worthwhile to test this hypothesis by looking in more detail 
at changes in these "other factors" over time, e.g.  by tracing out the course 
of the shift from universalist (wholist) to particularist (specialized) thinking. 
The model that would be used for conducting such studies would assume that 
the essence of the Scientific Revolution is an underlying change in basic values, 
which is symptomatically manifest as, among other traits, changing metho- 
dologies, world views, occupational patterns, educational programs, support 
structures, interest priorities, and a host of other factors discussed in histories 
of science. 
That there are complex and important values transformations taking place 
during the medieval period has long been recognized. Brian Stocks paper in 
this volume and longer study of literacy represent only one of many recent 
attempts to understand the priorities of persons who lived before the obvious 
great surge that produced the modern era.I0 Lynn White has on numerous 
occasions advanced hypotheses on how technological thinking and techno- 
logical values slowly captivated the Western mind. In particular, White has 
attempted to turn the traditional top-down mentality of scholars on its head 
and to show how technological values slowly changed the way intellectuals 
at the top thought about learning." If such studies were accompanied by a 
genuine recognition of their importance to a full understanding of the rele- 
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vance of the Middle Ages to the history of science and technology, the extent 
of that relevance could, I believe, be delineated with much greater precision 
and meaning. 
The importance of changing values during the Middle Ages did not escape 
the notice of those who were affected. As one commentator on the contem- 
porary scene in the thirteenth century lamented: 
The muses are silent, confounded, repelled, as if numbed by the sight of Medusa. 
But why, you ask? If you are a real scholar you are thrust out in the cold. Unless 
you are a money-maker, I say, you will be considered a fool, a pauper. The lucra- 
tive arts, such as law and medicine, are now in vogue, and only those things 
are pursued which have a cash value.12 
For those of such a practical mind, the way of the future was clear. So it was 
that one father advised his son who had written for more money to study 
the Bible: "This requires, as I was told, a great deal of money. Therefore, you 
would be better advised to audit the arts, . . . either physics or another lucra- 
tive science, because you will not gain great wealth if you pursue the ministry."13 
The reflection of values in these two comments and the potential impact on 
medicine, law, and the whole structure of learning could not be clearer. 
So too have modern scholars recognized the importance of deep-seated 
transformations on the Scientific Revolution. Jacob Bronowski argues in his 
Common Sense of Science: 
We sometimes speak as if science has step by step squeezed other interests out 
of our culture, and is slowly strangling the traditional ways of thinking. Nothing 
of the kind. The Scientific Revolution in the seventeenth century was a universal 
revolution. Indeed it could not have been unless there had already been a deep 
change in the attitudes to everything natural and supernatural among thoughtful 
men. Puritanism in England and Protestant martyrdom on the Continent are 
the religious traces of that change; Marvel and Molihre mark it in the arts, and 
Cromwell's revolution and the wars of Louis XIV are its political traces. Nor, 
of course, were these changes in the climate of mind without practical antece- 
dents. At the bottom, all derive from the explosion of the rigid hierarchy of land 
and craft which was the medieval world. . . .I4 
For Bronowski, this'lregress to first causes takes us too far from the Scientific 
Revolution itself." In my view, such a "regress to first causes" takes us to the 
very heart of the Scientific Revolution and deserves to become the focal point 
of considerably more scholarly attention. It is only by pursuing such studies 
that the true relevance of the Middle Ages to the history of science and tech- 
nology can be established. 
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